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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES JOSEPH, TAMARA LEE 
JOSEPH, and :MELANIE JOSEPH) 
by Their Guardian ad litem, 
CHARLES JOSEPH, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
W. H. GROVES LATTER ... DAY 
SAINTS HOSPITAL~ a corporation, 
De/en_dant and Respondent. 
Case No .. 
9068 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STA TE:MENT OF FACTS 
In general the respondent agrees with the very 
sketchy statement of facts contained in appellants"' brief. 
However:- respondent deems it necessary to elaborate on 
appellants"' statement and cannot agree with it in its 
entirety. 
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For instance, respondent cannot agree that soon after 
the. second pint o.f . blood was started :Mrs. Joseph began 
sweating and chilling. The· only reliable evidence ~ the 
record· controverts this claim. The testimony of respond-
ent" s nurses is very strongly to the effect that no noticeable 
sweating or chilling occurred. Rosemary Meyer Miller~ 
a registered nurse in attendance upon Mrs. Joseph, testi-
fied positively to this eff cc t and further that she observed 
this p a ticn t personally on several occasions during the 
trans fusion and saw no evidence of sweating or chilling. 
(Tr. 202-206.) · · 
T 0 the Saine effect was the testimony of Hedy r. 
Davis, a practical nurse likewise personally in attendance 
'upon Mrs. Joseph on ·the day of this blood transfusion. 
(Tr. 229-232.) 
Apparently the jury believed this testimony became 
it returned a speci_al verdict that there was nothing in 
Mrs. Joseph~s condition .during the time when the second 
transfusion was being given to in die ate that she was having 
a transfusion reaction (T r. 2 81 ) • 
The qnly testimo9y supporting the· statement in ap-
pellants"' brief was given by the plaintiff himself. 
On the question of what caused the lower· nephron 
nephrosis; which w~ ·the cause of death} it is conceded that 
the medical experts all testi£ed · tha. t its probable or most 
l~ely cau~ was. a he.molytic transfusion reaction4 How-
~ver, they all agreed that lower nephron nephrosis has many 
·causes and · tha. t it was not impnssi ble that .1 ts cause in thjs 
case could have been from something besides a transfusion 
reaction. 
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Illustrative of this evidence is the testimony of Dr. 
Wintrobe (Tr. 164). 
This may be unimportant in this case because the 
case was submitted by the trial court to the jury upon the 
appellants' theory that a transfusion reaction did in fact 
occur. (Ins t. No. 1 0 ~ R. 3 21.) 
Inasmuch as appellants make much of the conten-
tion in their argument that in processing the blood used 
for the transfusion a mix-up could have occurred,. re-
spondent deems it of great importance to include in this 
statement references to the procedures followed in the 
de£ end ant hospital in the selection and preparation of 
blood for transfusions. This evidence is uncontroverted. 
The steps are as follows: 
1.. A donor presents himself at the blood bank and 
fills out a card which contains information necessary to a 
determination of his fi. tness to donate blood. 
2. A registered nur.se draws the blood directly from 
the donor into a bottle of 500 ccs. capacity .. 
3. When the bottle i_s full, the nurse fills three pilot 
tubes, also directly from the donor. 
4t She then attaches identically printed numbered 
gummed labels to the donor card, the bottle and pilot tubes 
containing the donor's blood. 
5. When the process of drawing the blood· and num-
bering .is complete, the nur.se then attaches one numbered 
pilot tube to the identically numbered transfusion bottle 
and this is then placed in a refrigerator. The other two 
identically numbered pilot tubes are taken to the labora-
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4 
tory where, the blood is tested for type and Rh factor and 
other necessary information, after which these two pilot 
tubes are placed in the refrigerator with the transfusion 
bottle and the third pilot tube .. All of these tubes and the 
bottle are attached to each other by masking tape and re-
main in the refrigerator until the blood is either used or 
discarded. The entire donor procedure is handled by the 
same nurse.. ( T r. 18 5, 18 6, 24 2~ 2 4 6 t Ex. P4, D 5 & D 6) .. 
When the hospital blood bank is called upon to fur-
nish blood for a transfusiont the following procedure oc-
curs: 
1.. The patient,s blood is typed from a direct sample 
taken by a technician. 
2. Blood of the same type and Rh factor contained 
in the pilot tubes is then taken from the stored blood in 
the refrigerator, which, as above pointed out, has already 
been typed and labelled. 
3. The patient~ s blood and the donor"s blood is then 
matched and cross-matched to determine compatibility. 
4. If the tests made indicate compa tibj}ity ~ the blood 
is then sent to the operating room or the patient~s hospital 
room, where a doc tor starts the actual transfusion process .. 
(Tr. 247-249 .. ) 
There is not even a shred of evidence that this pro-
ced u re failed at any point in this case so that Mrs. Joseph 
was given blood which was improperly typed or mis-
matched with her own. 
An_other 1m por tant and vital paint involved in this 
case, which appellants rna ke only slight and passing refer-
ence to, is that these tests are not infalliblet Despite the 
most meticulous care there is inherent in every blood 
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transfusion a risk that approved and recognized testing 
of blood will not reveal latent incompatibility which can-
not be d~tected or avoided. Thus:~ from 1/10 to 5/10 of 
I% of transfusions will inevitably resu It in hemolytic re-
act ion and a bout 40% of these accidents will cause death. 
To t h [s effect testified every ex pert who was called 
to the witness stand~ in-cluding Dr. Wintrobc and Drt 
Crockett4 (Tr .. 112- I 14; I 1.5; 154~56; 165.) 
Both Dr .. Crockett and Dr. Wintrobe, both of whom 
were c ailed by appellants~ positively tcsti6 ed they could 
find no evidence upon which they could base an opin.io11 
that Mrs. Joseph had been given the ~Trong blood~ or that 
this blood had been improperly selected or processed. (Tr .. 
112 ~ 164-16 5 ~ 170-71.) Furthermore there is not one 
iota of evidence of any mixup occurring which appellants 
urge in jus ti:fic a tion of a reversal. 
Also, the only symptoms of incompatible blood 
claimed by appellants and testi£cd to by plain tiff himself 
was that his wife at s orne indefinite time during the trails-
fusion of the second pint of blood, began to sweat pro~ 
fusely and have chills. The other symptoms of a trans-
fusion reaction were entirely absent and those claimed by 
plaintiff were controverted by defendant's nurses. (Tr. 99~ 
115} 116 .. ) 
Further, some sweating and chilling is to be expected 
following any long and complicated surgery.. (Tr4 116, 
179.) A transfusion chill will shake the bed .. (Tr. 116.) 
One final reference to the testimony should be made. 
Following the development of symptoms of kidney 
failure in Mrs. Joseph) tests were c_onducted by the has-
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pi tal to ascertain if possibly a mistake had been made in 
the selection of the blood for the transfusion. It is un-
controverted that these re-tests affirmed the procedures 
which had been originally used. No evidence of incom~ 
pacibility of blood could be demonstrated. Even the donors 
themselves were recalled and tested and no claim is made 
that the donors were not of the same blood type and Rh 
factor as Mrs4 Joseph. (Tr. 23 6~259; Ex. D7; R25-R27.) 
As to the pleadings it should be observed that appel-
lants did not plead res ipsa loquitur nor did they at any 
time during the trial indicate their reliance upon the doc-
trine until a request to instruct was made. ( Rl-44) 
STATE:MENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS 
REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TilE CASE ON THE 
THEORY OF RES IPSA LOQUrnTR. 
POINT II. 
THE APPELLANTSt HA VINO. FAILED TO 
PLEAD RES IPSA LOQUITURt 'WERE NOT EN-
TITLED TO AN INSTRucnoN ON THAT 
THEORY. 
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ARGU_MENT 
POINT It 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS 
REFUSAL TO SUBMIT THE CASE ON THE 
THEORY OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR. 
The appellants' principal ground of complaint is 
based upon the refusal of the tr tal court to submit this case 
to the jury on the theory of res ipsa loquitur. The trial 
court stated three reasons for refusing to instruct as ap~ 
pella n ts requested: 
1. Because deaths do occur in blood transfus[on cases 
without negligence. 
2.. Because the appellants did not plead res ipsa 
loquitur, and 
3. The appellants relied upon and attempted to 
prove specific negligence. ( Tr. 271-2 72.) 
The complaint alleged that the hospital was negligent 
in administering incompatible blood to Mrs. Joseph and 
that the hospital was further negligent because it failed to 
terminate the transfusion when its servants knew or should 
have known that the blood being transfused was causing 
.a reaction. 
As we have already pointed out the case was .sub-
mitted to the jury to determine if there was negligenc:e in 
not stopping the transfusion. The jury found for the de-
fendant on this issue and no complaint is made by appcl-
lan ts of this finding. 
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.& far as . the record. shows there is not one scintilla 
of evidence which supports the contention that the hos-
pital~ t~rough negligenc.e, administered incompatible blood 
to the decedent. · 
On the contrary, the. record establishes without con-
tradiction that, as far as medical science could determine 
this blood was in fact compat1ble. The hospital produced 
1 ts entire record and disclosed all the facts which it knew 
or could ascertain bearing upon this question. The appel-
lants h.ad full and free access to this information and knew 
the names of every witness whose testimony was available 
to the respondent and who could shed any light upon 
what occurred .. 
The final conclusion of the experts was unanimous 
that the likely or probable cause of death of decedent was 
some hidden, inherent or latent incompatibility of the 
donors' blood which could not be demonstrated by any 
test which could be applied to it. They all stated that 
there are many causes of lower nephron nephrosis and 
that incompatible blood is only one of them and it could 
not be .stated. with absolute certainty that incompatible 
blood was the cause of death in this case. They all further 
agreed that death occurs from transfusion reactions which 
cannot be explained because· the particular thing which 
sometimes goes wrong when a donor,..s blood is mixed with 
that of a patient· is unknown and cannot be discovered 
by any known or recognized scientific test. 
The record js further clear .and uncontradicted that 
. . 
. th~ tests used by the hospi.tal were correct, accepted and 
recognized. There£ ore, the record lies in this posture-
that in a certain percentage of cases, . transfusion reactions 
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will happen and cannot be prevented no matter how care-
ful the te-chnicians are in applying the tests which usually 
reveal in compatibility. 
Appellants on these facts would subject the defendant 
hospital to an inference of negligence when the record 
shows as a £act that this unfortunate accident was one 
which the hospital 'v a.s helpless to prevent. This they seek 
to justify on the specious argument that appellants were 
not present when the blood was tested, where a possible 
mixup might have occurred and because the tests were 
made from pilot tubes and not from the actual bottle of 
blood which was used. We have pointed out that the blood 
in the transfusion bottle and in the pilot tubes was identi-
cal and that the procedures used rnake the possibility of 
n1ixup conjectural and far~fetched in the extreme. 
In short, the appellants fail to point to one single 
fact upon which a charge of negligence of any kind could 
be supported. 
As respondent understands the rational of appellants" 
argument, it is about as follows: 
1. There are tests which wiU reveal incompatibility 
factors in blood in the vast majority of cases~ but, it is 
acknowledged, this is not always so. It is admitted that 
in rare cases these tests fail for reasons w hie h cannot be 
explained. 
2. It is argued that res ipsa loquitur applies in those 
cases where an injury does not ordinarii y result, based upon 
past human experience, ~nd, _where the instrumentality 
causing- injury is controlled by tjle defendant and not by 
the pl~intiff, who himself does not a~t to_ bring injury u_pon 
hinisel£4 
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Respondent believes that it is proper and very logical 
to argue that the element of control essential to the appli-
cation of res ipsa loquitur in a blood transfusion case is 
lacking so that res ipsa loquitur cannot apply4 It is re-
spectfully submitted that such control is lacking because 
the hospital or technician using blood must of necessity 
take it from a donor who manufactured it by his own 
bodily functions and proce55es. The hospital thus takes 
the blood as it finds it.. If it be also true, as the record 
here disc loses without dispute, that testing is falli blc in 
exceptional cases and the record further shows that all the 
known and available means for determining compatibility 
are used, as is the case here, and that, as far as could be de-
termined by such tests~ the blood is compatible for a given 
patient~ but, in spite of such testing an incompatibility 
existed which was unknown and could not be ascertained, 
then the element of exclusive control is lacking. 
In addition, no one knows in this case where the hid-
den factor causing a react ion actually was, whether it was 
some hidden factor in the donor"'s blood, or whether it was 
a hidden factor present in 1\irs. Joseph~s blood. The hospi-
tal selected and furnished the blood of a donor but it 
certainly had no control at all over the condition of the 
patient .. If the cause of the reactjon was due to the unde-
terminable condition of the patient ,s blood, then the ele-
ment of control by the defendant was entirely lacking4 
Until it is demonstrated by competent evidence where the 
o bno:x.ious or incompatible factors origina ted:t either in 
the donor or the patient, there is no room for the con-
tention that the cause of injury was under the control of 
rh e hospital. There is absolutely no such evidence in this 
case. It is only in those cases where it can be shown beyond 
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dispute that the agency causing injury or harm was in 
fact under the control of the party charged with negli-
gence that the doctrine can apply. 
A blood transfusion case is not the same as one in-
volving a manufactured or processed art1cle over which 
the manufacturer or proces~or exercises absolute and com-
plete control. 
But even if these arguments are rejected the doctrine 
still cannot apply here bee a use t! ansfusion reactions do 
occur in the absence of neg]igence. True, they do not hap-
pen very often, but they occur in I/1 0 to 5/10 of 1% of 
the cases. (Tr .. 112~ 114; 115; 154-15 6; 165.) We submit 
it is a non scqui tur to argue that be ca usc an occurrence is 
rare or unexpected it is not ordinary.. Numerically it may 
be rare but statistically it is as ordinary as death or taxes. 
Statistically it has been established, as this record con-
clusive 1 y shows, that as inexorable as £ate itself these re-
actions will occur and nothing which man has yet devised 
will prevent them from happening. 
Based upon these facts we submit it would be grossly 
unjust to subject a hospital or a doctor or a technic ian to 
liability and an inference of negligence for something 
which may not be preventable. The doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur was not invented for the purpose of imposing 
liability upon the innocent merely because a plaintiff is 
unable to produce any evidence to prove his case. 
In Dees vs. Pace, Calif. 257 Pac. 2d. 756~ a doctor was 
sued for malpractice in the performance of an hysterec-
tomy.. In that case two doctors testified that they had 
performed many hysterectomies without fistulas as an 
aftermath of surgery. The plaintiff contended, as appel-
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lants do in this case, that because o £ this testimony res ipsa 
loquitur was applicable. In rejecting thiS argument that 
court said: 
C'-The plaintiff contends that the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur is applicable in this case in v-iew 
of the testimony of Dr. Lamb and Dr. Shephard 
that in the many hysterectomies performed by 
them no fistulas had rcsul ted, and also in the testi-.. 
mony of Dr. Harrison and Dr. Shephard that the· 
inc id en ce of fistulas in such c ase.s i:s .small. The 
mere fact in itscl f that an unfavorable result is 
somewhat rare does not give rise to such an in-
ference4 The court refused to invoke the doctrine 
in Farber v.L Olson, supra, and in Engelking vs .. 
Carlson, supra, where the incidence is small. )j 
!he test is not whether the number of transfusion 
reactions is rare or common, but rather, whether in the 
ordinary course of events they inevitably will happen 
without negligence. 
Of course the record here, as appellants are compelled 
to admit, supports the conclusion that they do so occur4 
The conclusion of Dees vs. Pace:) supra~ is approved in 
the case of Salgo vs. Leland Stanford University, Calif .. 317 
P. 2d. 170, w hete a case was reversed for error in the giv-
"ing of an instruction on res ipsa loquitur in a mal practic.e 
case ·involving an aortography where that court said: 
uThls brings us to the question of whether 
·. there was· any professional evidence calling for the 
application of the doctrinet Plain tiff's medical 
witnesses do not testify on this subject, but all the 
witnesses agree that paralysis is· a rare complica-
tion of a'?~ogr~phy .. '"(his fact does not prove that 
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it normally does not occur in the absence of negli-.. 
gence ..... u 
That court also makes some very pertinent observa-
tions respecting the application of res ipsa loquitur in mal-
practice cases in the following language: 
t~The great difficulty in the application of the 
doctrine (res ipsa loquitur) is to determine where 
to draw the line .. To apply it in all cases where an 
unexpected result occurs would hamstring the de .. 
veloprnent of medical science.. No medical man 
would dare to use new procedures~ especially in 
surgery; because if injury resulted he would be 
prima facie guilty of negligence~ Medical science 
has developed in leaps and strides in the past few 
years.. Procedures that 40 years or even 1 0 years 
ago, would have been considered impracticable and 
fatal are now being successfully used; for example, 
surgery upon the heart. Even the procedure used 
in this case, translumbar aortography where the 
aorta ~ punctured and a foreign substance injected 
in order to determine the location of a suspected 
block, is one which but a few years ago would not 
have been attempted but one which is of great 
value in determining whether or not corrective 
surgery is needed and advisable. Thus a great re-
sponsibility rests upon the .. cour.ts-to determine 
the point at w/Jich the doctrine will apply i-n .order 
to be fair to a patietJf who has received !l result 
which either common kncrwledge of laymen o-r of 
medical men teaches ordinarily would not occur 
without negligence, and to be fair to the medical 
. men if there is a result which could occur uithaut 
negligence and which should not impose uPon them 
the presumption of negligence .. " 
It is. clear from this record that here we are dealing 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
with a case, where, to para phrase the 1 anguage of the 
California Court, u.there is a result which could occur 
without negligence and which should not impose upon 
them (medical men) the presumption of negligence.~' 
Similarly, in Wickoff vs. James, Calif. 324 P .. 2d. 661, 
it is held that the mere fact that a result is unexpected or 
not anticipated is not enough to invoke the doctrine .. 
In Mitchell vs. Friedman) New Jersey 78, Atl. 2d. 417, 
that court stated: 
~'=The ordinary course of events often in eludes 
the unexpected; sometimes it presents, what) in 
advance; would seem most unlikely to happen. ~ . /:. 
See also Cun,ningham vs. Neil House Hotel Co., Ohio, 
3 3 NE 2d. 859~ where the court said: 
4!4!The mere occurrence of an unusual or un-
explained accident~ if not su.ch as necessarily to 
involve negligence does not warrant application 
of the doctrine. ~!J 
Appellants point to no Utah case where the doctrine 
has been extended to the lengths contended for here and 
we know of no such holding by this court. 
On the other hand, this court in F&rest vs. Eason, 
123 Utah 610, 261 P .. 2d. 178, ~ays down the limits in 
which a case may be given to a jury in a malpractice case. 
-That case involved the alleged injection of. a. deleterious 
sul?stance into plaintiff~s veins .. It was co~tended that be-
cause there was testimony that the act of the defendant 
could have caused the injury complained of the case should 
. . 
have been submitted to th~ j~ry. This court said: 
~~Giving .th~ case to the jury under such cir~ 
cumstances with no shmuing that use of the sub-
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stance was not in accordance with accepted 
standards of professional skill, with no showing of 
the manner of the injection, and with no showing 
that any of the substances were deleterious allows 
the jury to indulge in that type of speculat[on un-
permitted by this or other courts generally~,~ 
The well accepted principle that res ipsa loquitur is 
not applicable when it has been shown that the damage 
claimed might be traced either to an act of negligence for 
which the defendant would be chargeable or to an acci-
dent or other cause for which he could not be held is illus-
trated by the case of Moose-A-Bee Quarries vs. Eastern 
Tractor & Equip-ment Co., Me., 29 Atl. 2d. 167~ Sec also 
Tremelling vs~ So. Pac. Co., 70 Utah 72, 257 Pac~ 1066 .. 
In Marfiu- vs. S~ P. Co., 46 Fed. Supp. 957, the court 
held that res ips a loquitur is not applicable in a case where 
liability of the defendant rests upon surmise or conjecture .. 
None of the cases relied upon by appellants get to 
the core of the question presented here. They all contain 
merely the trite statement of the rule that res ipsa loquitur 
is applicable if the injury is such that it would not have 
happened in the ordinary course of events unless negli ... 
gence is present. 
These cases are inapplicable as authority for this case 
because the evidence is that trans fusion reactions ·do occur 
in the ordinary course of events even without negligence. 
In Sher11UJ1't vs. Hartman, Calif~ 290 Pac. 2, 894,. there 
was direct evidence that the defendant ... s nurses had failed 
to check upon the transfusion until 200 cc. of blood had 
leaked in to the tissues surrounding the vein. There was no 
showing, such as in this caset that such leakage might occur 
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in spite of anything which defendant could have done to 
prevent it. The only evidence was that transfusion needles 
often come unstuck. 
In Seneris vs4 Haas, Calif. 291, Pac. 2, 915, there was 
direct positive evidence by a competent expert that there 
was .spinal cord damage which could have been caused by 
inserting the needle into the wrong place in plaintiff.ts 
spinal column .. With such evidence the court concluded 
it was proper to submit the c~sc on res ipsa loquitur even 
though there was testimony that the paralysis could have 
been caused without striking the· cord .. The question which 
the jury was allowed to determine was whether~ in fact~ de-
fendant .struck the cord with the needle. There was no 
claim that despite anything which defendant could have 
done there was no way that striking of the cord could be 
avoided in a certain percent age of cases. On the other 
hand, the record in this · case so conclusively proves the 
risk of unavoidable reactions. 
Milias vs, Wheeler Hospital, California 241, P. 2d. 
68 4, merely held that under the evidence, it was proper 
to submit res jpsa loquitur to the jury and let it decide 
whether or not to apply the doctrine. There was both 
evidence that the injury complained of could have been 
the result of burns from the application of too hot a bot~ 
tle or compress~ or that possibly the .scarring of the plain--. 
titf,s leg was due to her condition, which wou1d not 
tolerate the application of sufficient heat to obtain a bene-
£cial result and save her life, which condition, of course, 
was not the fault of the defendant. In none of these cases 
was there any evidence such as in this case that the result 
sometimes occurs without negligence and is inev-itable4 In 
all these cases cited by appellant there was some evidence 
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upon which a claim of negligence could be based4 Not so 
here. Here, as we have pointed out, there is no evidence 
of any negligent act on the part of respondent and the 
record shows without dispute that tr ansf us ion reactions 
are unavoidable even with the exercise of the._ utmost de-
gree of care and skill.. Finally there is no evidence pointing 
to any mishap or mixup of the blood. The verification 
of the original resting by exhaustive rechecks complete I y 
rules out this speculative hypo thesis~ 
Respondent takes exception to the citation of the 
quotations from Vol. 20 of the Am. Journal of Medical 
Technology and from Vol. 151 of the Journal of the 
American Medical Association as inadmissible hearsay and 
not a part of the record in this case and therefore im-
proper. 
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POINT II. 
THE APPELLANTS, HAVING FAILED TO 
PLEAD RES IPSA LOQUITUR~ WERE NOT EN-
TITLED TO AN INSTRUCTION ON THAI 
THEORY. 
Appellants have correctly stated the reasons given 
by the trial court in refusing to submit an instruction on 
res ipsa loquitur to the jury. The principal reason was 
that there was positive competent evidence in the record 
that transfusion reactions occur when no negligence can 
be demonstrated. This has been fully discussed under 
Point It The second ground of refusal to so instruct was 
that res ipsa loquitur was not pleaded. That this is so 
is manifest from the complaint itself. ( R. 1-4.) This is 
the Ia w in this jurisdiction. 
In Loos vs .. Mt. Fuel Supply, 99 Utah 4961 108 P. 2d. 
2 54, this cour tt speaking thru !\h. Justice Wolfe, said~ 
nln some cases where 8pecifi.c acts of negli-
gence are alleged in the complaint the specific 
allegations of violations of duty can be ignored 
and the pleadings .still .show a cause of action based 
on res ipsa loquitur. . • . Nevertheless we think one 
who wishes to rely on that doctrine,. as well as 
specifically assigned . acts of negligence, must so 
plead, either by a separate court (count) or by 
proper allegation to the effect that the negligence to 
be inferred from the general situation caused the 
injury thereby notifying the other party that he 
intends to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
To set out by way of inducement a situation which 
itself may bespeak a prima facie case of negligence 
and then follow with allegations of specific negli-
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gence and allege that by ~~reason of such negligent 
acts and omissions on the part of the defendant 
(respondent) (referring to those specific ally al-
leged) the plaintiff was injured/"' etc., docs not 
su:ffici ently put the defendant on notic c that the 
plaintiff is going to rely on the situation itself to 
furnish any infe renee of negligence.,, 
We submit therefore that the trial court was correct 
on at least two of the stated reasons for refusing appel-
lants_, request to instruct~ and therefore the verdict of 
the jury and the judgement entered thereon must be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted} 
RAY~ QUINNEY & NEBEKER and 
ALBERT R. BOWEN 
Attorneys for 
Defendant and Respondent. 
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